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LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL 
BODY, 1800-1976. By Robert Stevens. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. 1978. Pp. xviii, 701. $30. 
This ambitious book studies the evolution of the House of Lords 
from an eighteenth-century legislative, executive, and judicial body 
into a modern appellate court. In just over six hundred densely foot-
noted pages, Robert Stevens attempts to set forth the entire sociolog-
ical, jurisprudential, and political history of the House of Lords since 
the end of the Napoleonic wars (pp. xvi-xvii). The result, though not 
quite the definitive history that Stevens sought to write, remains the 
most comprehensive and engaging account of these years yet avail-
able to the American reader. 
The first half of the book describes the House's highly political 
and unprofessional judicial behavior during the nineteenth century, 
and the resulting early twentieth-century reforms. Most nineteenth-
century Lords were laymen either unqualified or uninterested in 
hearing appeals. The House therefore often failed to muster quo-
rums, faced huge case backlogs, and rendered poor decisions. While 
impeachment trials preoccupied many Lords, Scottish appeals based 
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on Roman law further clogged the docket. All of these failures made 
the Lords vulnerable to outside pressures: on several occasions, the 
judicial functions of the House were nearly abolished (pp. 52-67). A 
desire for self-preservation led the Lords toward reform. At one 
time, for example, the House literally forced peers to sit at appeals 
(pp. 19-21). The House eventually restricted seats at appeals to spe-
cial Law Lords who had studied law and were competent to render 
professional opinions (pp. 32-34). By the tum of the century, profes-
sionalism was becoming increasingly important. When the Lords 
lost virtually all of their legislative powers, the balance of law and 
politics in the House shifted toward law. Law Lords were then cho-
sen on the basis of their legal abilities, not their politics. 
Politics soon disappeared from the Lords' opinions (p. 320). 
Central to Stevens's analysis of the post-World War II period is a 
doctrine that he calls "substantive formalism." Formalists believed 
that judges should avoid making political judgments in deciding 
cases: they should rely strictly on precedent, even to the point of 
denying themselves the power to reverse their own prior decisions, 
no matter how anachronistic. Stevens criticizes this excessive re-
straint. Indeed, the Lords' rigid refusal to depart from precedent 
usually made a final appeal to the House an unnecessary formality 
and gave rise to yet another movement to abolish the House's judi-
cial capacity (pp. 321, 415). 
New reforms followed. Obeisance to precedent became less im-
portant. By distinguishing - and in some cases dramatically limit-
ing - the application of earlier cases, the Lords began to make 
policy decisions. The 1966 Practice Statement formally recognized 
this development. The statement announced that henceforth the 
Lords might reexamine precedent where its value had diminished 
over time or where its strict application would produce undue hard-
ship (p. 419). But Stevens cautions that this announcement was only 
symbolically important (p. 621). The Practice Statement simply 
made it easier for the Lords to do directly what they had previously 
done indirectly. 
With the rise of the Law Lord's policy-making authority came a 
new set of political problems, best characterized as problems of con-
stitutional powers. The controversy over stare decisis ( and a parallel 
dispute over statutory interpretation) only typify the Lords' .difficul-
ties. After all of the reforms of the past quarter century, the Lords 
still remain uncertain of their power to interpret acts of Parliament 
(pp. 621-27). 
Law and Politics should interest every legal historian. Much of 
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the book is cast in the form of capsule biographies that contain con-
cise appraisals of the views and accomplishments of the more impor-
tant Chancellors and Law Lords. To the extent that Stevens's 
attempts to find order and progressive development in one-hundred-
fifty years of impossibly complicated history fails, it is because the 
capsule biographies reveal that none of the periods discussed is as 
homogeneous as his historical analysis suggests. The limited tenure 
of many of the Law Lords and the few cases that they decided in any 
particular area oflaw make it difficult to trust some of Stevens's gen-
eralizations, and the treatment of the many events and cases used in 
the biographies often seems disjointed. Few, in sum, will dispute the 
importance of Stevens's work. But many will question the suitability 
of the method to the task. 1 
I. For other reviews of Law and Politics, see Boudin, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REV. 452 
(1979); Gardiner, Book Review, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 584 (1980); Hiller, Book Review, 14 VAL, 
U.L. REV. 171 (1979); Jacob, Book Review, 43 Moo. L. Rev. 89 (1980); Recent Publications, 
16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 681 (1979). 
